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Asst. Deputy Director (Intelligence)

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6 March 1953

Comments on Stalin's Death as Affecting Sino-Soviet Relations

(Note: This memo is forwarded at your request as being possibly relevant to other contributions which you will be receiving on this general subject. In this brief time I have not been able to organize my thoughts in any coherent way and the following remarks are really only random observations.)

1. Georgi Malenkov was the first Soviet leader to indicate the policy line which Communist China was to take immediately following the success of the Chinese Communist "revolution" in 1949. It was in September 1949 that Malenkov in a speech before the Moscow Soviet expressed himself to the effect that (a) the success of the Chinese revolution had raised the world communist revolution to a new and higher level, and (b) that the way which had been followed by the Chinese Communists in achieving their success should be the way of "liberation of the oppressed colonial and semi-colonial peoples of Asia". (It was not clearly indicated whether the "liberating" was to be done by the peoples themselves or with the active participation of the Chinese Communist forces.) This line was taken up and accepted by Liu Shao Ch'i (leading Communist Chinese theoretician and Vice President of the World Federation of Trade Unions) in his opening address before the congress of the WFTU in November 1949. Liu Shao Ch'i's speech was printed in full in a December 1949 issue of the Cominform Journal and was the subject of leading articles in two subsequent issues of the Cominform Journal in January and February 1950. This line, originating from Malenkov, became the program of Asian communist aggressive, subversive and "liberation" movements in Korea, Indochina, the Philippines, Malaya, etc.

2. Molotov was reportedly deputed to develop the foreign policy of the USSR in respect to China, beginning, I believe, in mid-1949; his presence was announced in Peking in early 1950. It may be that he was initially concerned in developing the party line in China and that he has been more or less in charge of the policy and public relations aspects of Soviet relations with China since that time, since he has been prominently mentioned in connection with receptions given to Chinese Communist visitors in Moscow. He was also presumably involved in discussions concerned with the transfer of Soviet-seized Japanese assets and the return thereof to the Chinese Communists.

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3. The writings of Mao Tse-Tung have not strictly followed the ideological lines laid down in Leninist-Stalinist writings. The difference has been in respect to the importance of farmers in the revolution, as to whether they should constitute the main forces or whether the intellectual elite should be considered the vanguard of the proletariat who would in turn lead the farm workers in their revolt against the land owners. Mao Tse-Tung apparently considered the farm proletariat as the key element in China, but since mid-1950 Mao Tse-Tung and other speakers on behalf of the CCP have more or less adopted the Soviet interpretation of the place of farmers as subordinate to the city proletariat in party doctrine. An exception to this line was indicated in early 1952 when certain Chinese Communist leaders played up the position of Mao as a party theoretician in his own right, but this brought forth a strong statement in Pravda in May 1952, I believe, to the effect that there was only one master theoretician in the world Communist Party, namely, Stalin.

4. It should be remembered that the Chinese Communists were the first national Party ever to stage a successful revolution from the inside and then place themselves voluntarily under the domination of the Soviet hierarchy. This has been done presumably with a mutual understanding as to the leading position of the Chinese People's Republic in respect to the communist movement in Asia. This, I believe, is the dominant consideration in the minds of the Chinese Communist leaders in their relationship with the USSR as the motherland of world communism. The ostensible reorganization of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union last October was attended by Chinese Communist representatives and since then the report of progress delivered by Malenkov at the October party conference and Stalin's "Problems of Socialism in the USSR" have been avidly studied by Chinese Communists. Their public remarks in this connection have paid deference to the governing position of the USSR in the world communist movement but have always included a statement of the part of Communist China in developing the movement in Asia.

5. The foregoing observations lead me to the following speculative conclusions: (a) The Chinese Communist leaders will be able to work with any Soviet dictator or dictatorial committee that gives pre-eminence to the Chinese Communists as claimants to the hegemony of Asia within the world Communist movement. (b) Communist China's hegemony over Asia can only be attained by establishing the power of Communist China in its own right through


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industrialization and the training and equipment of its military forces. In the initial stages, Communist China's almost complete dependence on the USSR for military and technical assistance and equipment precludes any break between Communist China and the USSR either ideologically or in their politico-economic relations as long as the USSR renders support to Communist China's drive for industrialization and military power. (c) Should the USSR become pre-occupied with its own internal troubles or development and withdraw its support of Communist China's build-up, the Chinese Communist leaders would probably break with the USSR and seek support for its aims from wherever such aid could be obtained. If such support were not readily obtainable, Communist China might first accept the UN terms in Korea, then threaten and even ^{attempt to} carry out the military seizure of Southeast Asia as a means of reaching a permanent settlement with the West.

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